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Abstract: Capital flows have become increasingly more volatile over the past
decade, causing growing concern in emerging markets over the potential damages
large sudden capital inflows and outflows can cause those economies. Capital
controls have been used since World War I as a way to try to control these flows.
After being abolished nearly everywhere, they have recently been reintroduced in
a number of countries. The main analysis of this paper looks at the effect of the
capital controls on capital inflows from 2000 through 2010 in an 8 country sample
of emerging markets who have recently implemented changes in their capital
control policies: Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, South Korea, Peru, South Africa,
Thailand and Turkey. The paper adds to the current literature by contributing a
cross-country analysis, as well as by using a more sophisticated measure of
capital controls. Despite these measures, this paper finds that there is no robust
evidence that capital controls significantly reduce short-term or long-term
inflows, confirming the results of previous literature. Thus, this paper concludes
that the use of capital controls as one way to control the volatile capital flows
cannot be supported.

I.

Introduction
Due to the recent economic crises around the world, many countries, especially
emerging markets, have adopted capital controls as a way to protect their economies from
large, potentially damaging capital inflows. While capital inflows can be helpful to a less
developed economy, by financing investment and stimulating economic growth, they can
also have a negative effect on an economy, especially when the capital is withdrawn
shortly after entering. These damaging capital flows can lead to high inflation, real
exchange rate appreciation, and the widening of capital account deficits (Calvo,
Leiderman, and Reinhart 1996). The goal of capital controls today is to curb the large
short-term capital inflows in order to protect emerging markets from the negative effects
associated with the reversal of those flows.
The use of capital controls to protect against negative effects from large shortterm capital inflows is a change from the original use of capital controls. When capital
controls were first introduced during WWI, they were usually in the form of taxes that
helped to support government revenue during the war effort. These types of controls
continued through the signing of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of
Agreement in 1944 and were popular with almost all countries, developed or developing.
However, in the 1970s and 1980s, the IMF and World Bank encouraged countries to
remove their capital controls with the goal of achieving free capital mobility. They
claimed that capital controls, like tariffs on goods, were detrimental to the gains from
capital mobility (comparable to free trade) (Neely 1999). However, in the aftermath of
financial crises, such as the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and the current world
economic crisis, capital controls have again been instituted in some countries, especially
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in emerging markets, as protective measures. Currently, the IMF even goes as far as to
recommend capital controls as one policy, among others such as sterilized intervention
and exchange rate appreciation, to slow unwanted capital flows (Moghadam 2011).
One example of the kind of crisis that capital controls are trying to prevent is the
balance of payments crisis in Mexico in the 1980s. This crisis followed a period of large
capital inflows in the late 1970s. The episode highlights how developing capital
importing countries, as measured by net capital inflows being positive, are extremely
vulnerable to abrupt reversals in capital flows (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1996). It
is this type of reversal and subsequent economic crisis that the current round of capital
controls are trying to prevent.
There are still different opinions pertaining to the usefulness of capital controls.
While some economists claim that capital controls are still more harmful than helpful,
others see capital controls as a justifiable measure to stabilize capital inflows (Neely
1999). However, there is a lack of studies done to evaluate the recent surge of capital
controls; most focus on the 1990s and earlier (see Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff, (2011)).
Most of the papers on this topic focus on a theoretical approach to the problem (see
Reinhart and Smith (2001)), an empirical approach with only one country (Clements and
Kamil (2009)), or a qualitative approach with no empirical study (see Epstein, Grabel,
and Jomo (2003) and Ostry et al. (2010)). Baba and Kokenyne (2011) looked at capital
inflows in the 2000s for multiple countries, but their analysis stopped before the financial
crisis in 2008 and analyzed the countries individually. This paper attempts to fill some of
these gaps by doing an empirical analysis on multiple countries over the years 2000 to
2010.
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Additionally, there are multiple capital control measures used in previous studies.
Indices (Miniane (2004), binary dummy variables (Clements and Kamil (2009)), and
measures of capital openness (Edison and Warnock (2001)) are all used to measure
capital controls. This paper, though, creates a more sophisticated approach, by combining
an index and a binary dummy control to more fully capture the effects of changes in
capital controls.
To that effect, this paper measures if capital controls significantly change the
levels of capital inflows, both in terms of short-term and long-term flows. The short- and
long-term flows need to be treated separately due to their different natures. Short-term
flows are vehicles for investors to earn a return, and are therefore much more volatile
than long-term flows, which are production oriented. Therefore, the changes in capital
control policy can affect short-term and long-term flows differently.
If flows were significantly affected, that would suggest that capital controls are a
useful policy approach, at least in the short run, to protecting an economy against the
reversal of capital flows. Using panel data, this paper identifies any effects from changes
in capital controls from time series variation, like previous papers, as well as from
differences across countries. As there is frequently little variation in the capital control
index within a country, the cross sectional analysis gives additional evidence that
otherwise would be unobserved. The policy implications of these results will also be
discussed.
This paper finds that capital controls do not significantly decrease the levels of
either short-term or long-term capital flows. This result holds even with a more
sophisticated measure of capital controls, as well as across multiple measures of flows.
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The short-term flows are a good fit with the model, as measured by the Wald statistic, but
the long-term flows do not fit the model well. While all explanatory variables contribute
to the model, expected exchange rate appreciation, business cycles, and the depth of the
equity market are found to be the primary drivers of the variation in the capital flows.
The next section reviews the different types of capital flows, followed by a
discussion of relevant literature. The measurement issues associated with capital controls
are then discussed. Next, the model and the results are presented, followed by their policy
implications. Lastly, areas of further research are discussed.
II.

Types of Capital Inflows
The two main types of capital flows are Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and
Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI). Foreign Direct Investment refers to a foreign
company or individual who invests in a domestic enterprise and gains some sort of
controlling share, whether it is complete or minority ownership. An example of this
would be a U.S. company buying or building a factory in Brazil. Foreign Portfolio
Investment is when a foreign investor buys an interest in a domestic company or bond of
some sort, but the interest is not controlling. An example of this would be a U.S. mutual
fund or individual investor buying stocks or government bonds in Brazil1.
Potential investors have different concerns when considering FDI versus FPI, as
laid out in the 2004 Economic Report of the President. FDI is more permanent, and
therefore country characteristics that signal long term stability are more important. These
include factors such as political and legal stability. If a company fears that the

1

A third category of capital flows is “other investment”, which comprises flows that are not FDI
or FPI. Examples of this type of investment include trade credits, loans, and currency deposits.
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government might expropriate its foreign affiliate, it would be less likely to invest2.
Similarly, if a company fears that labor restrictions or environmental standards might
become stricter, it might choose to invest elsewhere. However, once the decision is made
to invest in FDI, it is more likely that a company, and its capital, will remain in the
country for a longer period of time. Therefore, the decision to invest in FDI in a country
is not based purely on the short-term yields of the investment.
The short-term yield is much more important in for FPI, in most cases. There are
many more alternatives with similar risk and yield in the rest of the world as opposed to
FDI. For example, there are only certain countries with low minimum wages and
environmental standards for a company to build a factory at very low costs, while there
are a vast amount of types of financial instruments globally for someone to invest their
money in, even at a given risk and yield. Therefore, if a certain country is not giving a
yield that an investor desires, or the investor expects the yield to decrease in the future,
the investor can simply liquidate their assets and invest somewhere else. The greater
liquidity in the FPI market, as compared to the FDI market, allows investors to quickly
enter and exit different global markets. This is shown in the example above, where it is
much harder to sell a factory than it is to sell shares of stock or government bonds.
Due to the liquid nature of FPI, it is far more speculative than FDI. If an investor
is considering building a factory, it will be a long-term investment, and therefore the
investor is less likely to be swayed by fads in the market or short-term economic
conditions. However, the ease of selling FPI assets allows investors to be speculative.
Investors can easily liquidate their assets if their speculations are wrong or conditions,
2

This is a legitimate concern for foreign firms in emerging markets. One example is the recent
expropriations of firms in Venezuela, who received no compensation for their loss (Economist
2010).
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such as expected yields, interest rates, or inflation, change. As a consequence, FPI flows
are much more volatile and potentially dangerous to an economy, especially to a
developing country with weaker financial institutions.
FPI flows are one of the largest concerns of emerging markets today during the
financial crisis. The high spread between government bonds and stocks as compared to
developed economies make emerging markets an attractive choice for FPI. As shown
below, the Emerging Market Bond Index (or EMBI spread), which is a weighted average
of the percent difference
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multiple lengths, is quite
large. This is a proxy for
the yield spread between
the emerging market and

the developed markets as a whole, not just the US. At a value of 100, the EMBI spread is
interpreted as the yield on a comparable length emerging market bond being twice as
much as the yield on the same US Treasury bond. Brazil’s values in the 1800s in 2002
indicate that the yield is eighteen times more on a Brazilian government bond than a US
treasury bond. While the spreads at the end of the decade are lower than they were at the
beginning, the spread is still quite large, at around 200 for most countries. Even if the risk
were substantially higher for these emerging markets, that yield would tempt a lot of
investors. However, if news came out that would indicate potential instability of the
Brazilian government or a potential of Brazil not being able to pay off its debt, most of
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those investors would probably flee very quickly, as they would feel that the risk is
greater than the reward. This illustrates not only how speculation and changes in market
conditions can greatly affect FPI, but also how quickly news of instability can cause very
large capital outflows.
Another reason for potential instability of capital flows is the uncertainty in the
recovery of the developed world. If the recession continues to last for multiple years, or if
there is a very slow recovery, these large yield spreads between developing and
developed countries are most likely going to be sustained over an even longer period of
time. This could mean that FPI stays in these developing countries for a longer period of
time. However, if the developed world recovers quickly, this spread could close quickly,
and again these capital flows could leave, as the risk of developing countries’ investments
is no longer coupled with a much larger yield (Moghadam 2011).
This risk of capital flight once the rest of the world recovers from the financial
crisis is a legitimate concern, due to past evidence on the matter. In the April 2011 World
Economic Outlook Report, published by the IMF, an entire chapter is dedicated to using
historical evidence of capital flows and their compositions to estimate how capital flows
will react in the coming years. One main result is that net flows to emerging market
economies have been higher during times of low global interest rates, low global risk
aversion, and higher growth in emerging markets relative to developed economies. These
conditions are all met during the current financial crisis. While this trend only explains
part of the volatility in capital flows, it indicates that emerging markets could see a
reversal of flows when the economic crisis is over.
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The capital controls used today are trying to make it harder for these reversals of
flows to happen. Since the volatility is coming from the short-term flows, the controls are
more focused on limiting FPI and other short term flows than longer term FDI flows. The
continuing uncertainty for the emerging markets is a problem, especially since it is not
only affected by internal factors. If it only was affected by domestic factors, the central
bank and government could try to control these. Instead, they are forced to use capital
controls, among other things, to protect the domestic economy and limit the damage if a
large reversal of flows occurs. Currently, the main tactic being used is to limit the
potential for a sudden reversal of flows by controlling the capital inflows into the
country.
Countries today are controlling inflows with capital controls due to the failure of
policies in preceding decades that attempted to control capital outflows with capital
controls. There are greater incentives to evade controls on outflows than controls on
inflows (Neely 1999). Evading controls on inflows generally only slightly increases the
return on an investment, while evading controls on outflows can prevent a severe
decrease in the value of an investment if, for example, a large currency devaluation is
expected in the near future. Therefore, as Obstfeld (1998) shows, limiting inflows in
order to prevent damaging outflows has a greater potential for success than trying to limit
damaging outflows directly.
This paper separates flows into categories besides the typical FPI and FDI, using
short-term and long-term flows instead. These categories are more comprehensive than
FDI and FPI, as long-term flows include FDI and other non short-term investments, while
short-term flows include FPI, derivatives, and other short-term investments, like short-
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term trade credits, currency and deposits, and short-term loans3. These classifications
were used in previous studies, such as Baba and Kokenyne (2011). As FDI is the main
component of long-term flows and FPI is the main component of short-term flows, the
differences between the two types mentioned above are directly applicable to these
different classifications of flows.
III.

Literature Review
Due to the abundance of capital control usage in the 1990s, especially in South

America and South East Asia, most of the literature on capital controls is centered on this
period. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1996) discuss the problems large capital inflows
can cause and possible policy solutions. Some of the problems mentioned include: rapid
monetary expansion, inflationary pressures, real exchange rate appreciation, and
increasing current account deficits. All of these problems can cause economic crises if the
problem escalates enough. For example, an increase in the current account deficit
translates into the increasing need for foreign capital to finance the gap between domestic
saving and domestic investment. Generally, increasing investment leads to growth in
GDP, which in turn leads to growth in consumption. This is good for an economy, until
the foreign financing disappears (a large and sudden reversal of flows). The reversed
flows can lead to a financial crisis and a recession.
As the paper discusses, some problems caused by capital inflows might be better
solved with policies other than capital controls. Some of these policies include
sterilization, which protects the money supply in order to slow down inflation and/or real
exchange rate appreciation, and tightening fiscal policy, which diminishes real exchange
3

In some cases, flows besides FDI and FPI were not available, so FDI and FPI were used as long
term and short term flows, respectively.
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rate appreciation and prevents the economy from overheating. While this paper is
extremely useful in exploring policy options outside of capital controls, it does not fully
explore capital controls as a policy option.
Epstein, Grabel, and Jomo (2003) take another approach, qualitatively analyzing
the effects of capital controls on developing countries in the 1990s. In addition to
outlining the measures used and the results of those measures, the authors also lay out the
objectives of each of the case studies. They demonstrate that different measures can be
used to achieve different outcomes, and therefore that “effectiveness” of the controls can
mean different things for different countries. These potential goals include: promoting
financial stability, promoting desirable types of investment/ discouraging undesirable
types of investment, and enhancing the autonomy of economic and social policy.
Therefore, if the goal of a country is to promote financial stability, then success might be
seen in the lack of a financial crisis. However, if the goal were to decrease short-term
capital inflows, then success would be a decrease in these inflows. The authors’
measurement of the success of capital controls by examining different policy goals is a
complimentary approach to the one used in this paper.
Reinhart and Smith (2001) focus on the capital flows in the 1990s that were very
large relative to the size of the country’s economy. Their theoretical analysis looks at
how temporary capital controls can be used effectively to reduce and limit temporary, or
short-term, capital inflows. The paper also discusses how controls on outflows and
inflows were effective in different ways and on different levels. However, they do not
provide any empirical evidence in support of their hypotheses.
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The recent re-emergence of capital controls has been the subject of some literature
on the effectiveness of these controls. Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011) discuss
episodes of capital control effectiveness across multiple countries in the 1990s and early
2000s. The paper attempts to find a uniform measure for capital controls. The use of a
capital control index allows them to standardize the results of multiple previous papers,
on multiple different countries and types of controls, in order to determine if controls are
effective. The paper finds that, on average, controls are effective in making monetary
policy more independent, changing the composition of flows towards longer maturities,
and reducing exchange rate pressures, but are ineffective in reducing the volume of net
flows.
Ostry et al. (2010) also discuss the recent uses of capital controls through
qualitative analysis, especially focusing on the rationales behind the controls. The paper
presents a straightforward “guide” as to when capital controls should be implemented.
The authors suggest that the controls should only be implemented as a last resort, after
policies such as allowing exchange rates to appreciate, accumulating reserves, lowering
interest rates, sterilizing the economy, and tightening fiscal policy. One important point,
though, is that capital controls might be a good way to control inflows when banking and
other financial regulations are not strong and are unable to be strengthened in the short
run. Furthermore, the paper reasons that capital controls lose their effectiveness over
time, as more loopholes and ways to evade the controls are found. Finally, the paper
discusses which types of capital inflows are potentially the most and least hurtful, with
portfolio flows having the most potential to harm an economy.
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Baba and Kokenyne (2011) look at capital inflows in four countries, Brazil,
Colombia, South Korea, and Thailand, over the 2000s. The authors find that controls are
associated with lengthening maturities of flows and that there is some association
between controls and decreasing flows, but those results were not significant in all cases.
They also find that the impact of the controls is not uniform across different countries,
but instead depend on the extensiveness of the policy, the sophistication of the capital
market, and the persistence of the capital flows. For example, the authors found that
Brazil’s recent increase in the foreign exchange tax and South Korea’s recent outflow
liberalization did not significantly change the volume of flows, but that Colombia and
Thailand’s increases in their respective unremunerated reserve requirements did help
create significant changes in flows. One of the paper’s strengths is the multiple measures
of capital controls used, incorporating not only the strength of the policy but also the
coverage of the controls (in terms of number of asset types covered).
There is also considerable literature that looks at the history of capital controls,
especially pertaining to the changing international view of capital controls. While
international policy has always allowed individual countries to determine their own
capital controls, there have been overarching trends as to the use and approval of capital
controls. Goodman and Pauly (1993) lay out the history behind the approval and usage of
capital controls up to the mid 1990s. The paper shows how the 1960s were dominated by
fixed exchange rates under the Bretton Woods Agreement, and therefore capital controls
were used as a way to maintain both the fixed exchange rates and monetary autonomy. In
the 1970s, the general opinion shifted when the Committee of Twenty of the IMF Board
of Governors concluded that capital controls had a potentially negative impact on trade
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and investment, and therefore should only be used temporarily. This, coupled with a
movement towards flexible exchange rates worldwide, helped to liberalize international
capital markets. Furthermore, the changing international financial markets and the
emergence of more and more multinational corporations in the 1980s and 1990s made
restricting capital controls more hurtful than beneficial to most countries (Goodman and
Pauly 1993).
During this period, the disapproval of capital controls stemmed from the losses
that capital controls can cause an economy and the gains that free capital mobility can
bring. One of the largest reasons for free capital mobility is the idea that capital flows
provide opportunities for countries with limited domestic financing options to attract
investors for their productive investment needs. These investments as a whole can
increase GDP, stimulate the economy, and provide gains for the entire country (Ostry et
al. 2010). Furthermore, these investments can trigger consumption increases as well as
help developed countries diversify their portfolios, especially in regards to pensions and
retirement accounts (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1996). On a global level, there are
also gains from increased capital flows, such as the further development of emerging
market financial sectors, which can also decrease the risk of a financial crisis and
increase investment opportunities in the future (Economic Report of the President 2004).
The 2004 Economic Report of the President outlines the direct costs of capital
controls. The controls take time and money to monitor and enforce, especially in terms of
closing loopholes as time goes on. From the beginning of the 2000s, these loopholes have
been more easily exploitable due to the start of online transactions. This, in turn,
increases the costs of closing and monitoring the loopholes. Controls also can decrease
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the transparency of companies who try to evade the controls, which in turn can lead to
larger compliance issues. Furthermore, controls decrease incentives for investment in that
country, which would reduce all of the positive effects of capital flows, listed above.
A recent report by the IMF, however, indicates that international opinion has
changed again, as the increasing volume and volatility of flows are seen to be dangerous,
especially to emerging markets. Moghadam (2011) discusses recent experiences with
capital inflows, and how they can migrate out of a country extremely quickly. The
empirical analysis shows that while capital inflows can be staggered in their arrivals into
different emerging markets, their exits are generally synchronized throughout those
markets. The IMF sees these abrupt and volatile reversals of flows as a serious concern to
emerging market economies (Moghadam 2011). One of the reasons for these quicker
reversals of flows in recent years is the changing composition of capital inflows. Portfolio
flows have become a larger part of overall inflows in the recent financial crisis. This can
be seen in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Gross Capital Inflows, by Type of Flows (percent share)

Figure 4. Gross Capital Inflows,
by Type
of Flows
Source:
Moghadam
2011 for Each Wave (percent share)
1995Q4 -1998Q2

2006Q4 -2008Q2

2009Q3 -2010Q2

18%

20%
All EM ex
China

41%

42%

40%

34%

Portfolio Inflows

40%

48%

17%

EM- Asia ex
China

Other Inflows

23%

38%

32%

24%

Direct Inflows

22%

42%

Other Inflows

Portfolio Inflows
Direct Inflows

39%

15

14%
EM- Latin
America

46%

54%

26%

25%
45%

29%

23%
Other Inflows

As shown above4, there is a large increase in the amount of FPI relative to FDI in
the composition of 2009Q3 – 2010Q2 flows relative to 2006Q4 – 2008Q2 flows. FPI
increases from around 17% to 48% of total flows. This increase in FPI substantially
increases the volatility of the flows, and as these flows are far less permanent and more
liquid than FDI, the flows can be reversed very quickly.
Not only is FPI much more volatile than FDI, but the volatility of FPI flows has
also been increasing over the past decade. In the table below, it is clear that the volatility
in FPI, as measured by the standard deviation of the flows, in the second half of the
decade is far greater than the first half of the decade.
Figure 3: Volatility of FPI (as Std. Dev.), 2000-20105
Country
Brazil
Colombia
Indonesia
South Korea
Peru
South Africa
Thailand
Turkey

2000Q1-2005Q2
3773.01
625.27
700.45
18069.14
56.18
1809.84
773.90
2730.76

2005Q3-2010Q4
15284.21
1201.55
2398.58
36024.44
461.69
4010.21
1668.08
5134.95

% Change
305.09%
92.16%
242.43%
99.37%
721.80%
121.58%
115.54%
88.04%

In all of the countries, the volatility in FPI flows increased significantly from the
beginning to the end of the decade. The increase was over 200% for three countries and
over 700% for Peru, with all countries experiencing increases of at least 80%6. This
volatility was one of the main catalysts of the capital control implementation.

4

All EM ex China means all emerging markets excluding China. This emerging markets
classification includes all countries listed as “emerging and developing economies” by the IMF’s
World Economic Outlook as of 1995. Additionally, see footnote (1) for which types of
investments are included in other investment.
5
These are the author’s calculations based on data on FPI flows. For sources of FPI flows, please
see Appendix A.
6
For comparison, other emerging market countries that have not recently implemented capital
controls have also seen increasing volatility in their FPI flows, but the increases are smaller. The
volatility in Ecuador’s FPI increased 73.4% from a value of 374.49 in the first half of the decade
to a value of 653.91 in the second half of the decade. Likewise, the volatility in the Philippines’
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The IMF’s policy recommendations for controlling the large and volatile inflows
and outflows are laid out in Moghadam (2011), and do include capital controls. The paper
does mention that the policies might not work in all country specific cases, but are instead
given as general guidelines. Either way, these policy recommendations clearly show that
the IMF is again moving towards approval of capital controls as a legitimate policy
response to large capital inflows.
IV.

Measuring Capital Controls
The largest challenges with measuring the effectiveness of capital controls are

determining which policies are considered capital controls and which are not and, more
importantly, how to measure those capital controls relative to one another. The first issue
is discussed in multiple papers, including Neely (1999), Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff
(2011), and Ostry et al. (2010). These papers all illustrate different types of capital
controls, and help to differentiate what is and is not considered a capital control. Neely
(1999) differentiates between capital controls and exchange controls. While exchange
controls, such as requiring importers to buy domestic currency for a stated purpose, may
limit capital inflows, they are not considered a capital control since controlling capital is
not its primary purpose. According to Ostry et al. (2010), capital controls include any
type of restriction on the ownership of domestic capital by foreigners, unremunerated
reserve requirements7 on foreign exchange debt, and any tax applied to foreign financial
transactions. This can also include restrictions on the ability of investors to repatriate

FPI increased 70.59% from a value of 884.15 in the first half of the decade to a value of 1508.80
in the second half of the decade.
7
An unremunerated reserve requirement is when a portion of a capital inflow is required to be
temporarily deposited into a non-interest earning central bank account (Economic Report of the
President 2004). This effectively decreases the yield the investor can earn on their investment,
therefore decreasing the incentive to invest in that market or with that type of investment vehicle.

17

their capital gains (Economic Report of the President 2004). Magud, Reinhart, and
Rogoff (2011) also point out the large heterogeneity of the measures applied by different
countries at different points in time, indicating that different types of capital controls are
not only theoretically possible but also used in multiple cases.
The second challenge is the larger and more important issue. In any model used, it
is hard to quantify such qualitative measures as capital controls. One approach used is the
measure of portfolio and direct investment as a percent of GDP. This measure is
analogous to the measure of trade openness, given by imports and exports as a percent of
GDP. This measure, though, is only indicative of long run changes in openness, as it is
too affected by other factors besides capital controls to be a good short term measure
(Edison and Warnock 2001). Edison and Warnock (2001) tried a different approach:
using the ratio of market capitalizations of two indices, one capturing a country’s equity
market as a whole and the other adjusting the market capitalization for restrictions of
foreigners, as a measure of financial openness. While this only captures the equity
market, the ability to calculate concrete values for the country over multiple years is a
large advantage. However, this measure cannot be used for the present paper since recent
data on capital market capitalization are unavailable for the countries studied.
Another possible solution is to use a binary dummy variable for capital controls,
where the value 1 is used for any type of capital control and the value 0 is used for the
complete absence of capital controls. This measure is used in papers such as Magud,
Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011) and Clements and Kamil (2009). While this is a relatively
easy measure to use, its effectiveness is limited as there is no differentiation between very
strict capital controls and very mild capital controls. Likewise, there is no differentiation
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between different types of controls, such as price controls (taxes) versus quantity controls
(restrictions).
The IMF proposes a more sophisticated measure, which assigns 6 categories with
1/0 values in the pre-1996 Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions (AREAER), and then further expands the categories to 13 in the post-1996
reports (Miniane 2004). These new classifications of 13 categories are relatively easy to
derive given capital control measures for any country or time period, and still provide a
better measure than the binary dummy variable. However, the index still does not capture
all changes in capital controls8. Miniane (2004) also used a similar method, using the
IMF’s 13 categories with slight adjustments, and adding another category if a country has
significant exchange restrictions. As discussed below, this paper will use the 13-category
index, as well as additional binary dummy variables to capture changes in capital controls
that are not captured in the index.
V.

The Model
Capital flows are affected by a multitude of different factors, some domestic and

some global. This model captures both types of these factors and isolates the effects of
capital controls on capital inflows. It is derived from Clements and Kamil (2009) and
Baba and Kokenyne (2011):
Flowi,t = !0 + !1CapControlsi,t + !2 EMBI i,t + !3 IntRateSpreadi,t + ! 4 FXi,t
+!5 ln(GDP)i,t + !6CapMktDepthi,t + ! 7 Recessiont + !8 Flowi,t!1 + "i,t

Here, Flow represents the net inflows into a country for a given category as the
dependent variable. These include short-term flows, as both the change in flows and the
8

For example, if a country increased their tax on inflows from 5% to 10%, the value in the
category would remain constant at “1”, as there are capital controls present in that category under
both circumstances.
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levels of flows, and long-term flows. The levels of flows will be analyzed as given as
well as with a three quarter moving average, which will control for some of the high
volatility in the flows. The lag of the dependent variable is also included in some
specifications. Using GMM allows for the inclusion of the lag without introducing bias.
The capital flows of a country are indicative of capital flows in the future, as even with
the considerable volatility in flows, so there is still a positive trend through the time
period. This would indicate that the expected sign of !8 is positive.
The first domestic factor is CapControls, the vector of variables that measures the
level of capital controls. This includes an index constructed with the AREAER
classifications as well as a variable that indicates any change in a given time period that is
not picked up by the index. The expected sign of !1 is negative, as more restrictive capital
controls would create a smaller amount of capital flows. This is the key variable of
interest in the model, as it will test the effectiveness of capital controls.
The log of a country’s real GDP, ln(GDP), a measure of a country’s business
cycles, is the next domestic factor. As laid out by Baba and Kokenyne (2011), investors
are attracted to strong economic growth, so the expected sign of !5 is positive. The
CapMktDepth vector of variables is also a domestic factor. The DebtMkt and EquityMkt
variables, measured by the World Bank Financial Structure Database (Alfaro et al 2004),
measure the capital market sophistication in each country. Both variables are expected to
have positively signed coefficients, as more sophisticated capital markets are expected to
yield higher flows.
The other variables in the model are measures of the domestic economy relative
to the rest of the world, in terms of how attractive investments in the domestic economy
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are relative to the rest of the world. EMBI is the average yield spread on a sovereign
foreign currency bond over a comparable U.S. treasury bond in percent per year and
IntRateSpread is the average interest rate differential between the domestic interbank rate
and the U.S. Fed’s fund rate, in percent per year. The expected signs of the interbank
interest rate spread coefficient, !3, and the government bond yield spread coefficient, !2,
are unclear, although they should move together. On one hand, an increase in the spread
of interest rates and bond yields indicate that investors can earn a higher yield on their
investment in that domestic economy relative to the developed world, which would
induce investors to increase their investments in that emerging market. This theory would
lead both coefficients to have a positive sign. On the other hand, that increased yield also
represents the risk of the investment. If investors respond to the risk instead of the yield,
the expected sign of the coefficients would be negative.
The exchange rate vector, FX, measures changes in the exchange rate, in the past
as well as through expectations in the future. It contains two exchange rate measures,
FXVol and FXExApp, which also are international factors. FXVol is the volatility of daily
changes in the nominal exchange rate, over the previous three-month period, and
FXExApp is a proxy for the expected appreciation in the exchange rate, which is
calculated as the percentile difference between the spot rate and three month forward rate
at the beginning of each quarter.
FXVol is a measure of the stability of the economy, on a day-to-day basis. A
higher volatility of the exchange rate over the last three months would indicate greater
instability, and therefore make investors less likely to invest in that country. Therefore,
the expected sign of the FXVol coefficient is negative.
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FXExApp reflects investors’ expectations of the world economy in the future. All
else equal, an expectation of appreciation in the future would indicate that the investment
in domestic currency would be worth more, relative to the rest of the world, in the future.
This would in turn increase the amount of capital flows into that economy. However,
since the forward rate and spot rate are measured relative to USD, as XXX/USD,
expected appreciation in the currency is seen as a smaller forward rate as compared to the
spot rate. This causes the expected sign of FXExApp to be negative, as a negative
differential (which is an indication of expected appreciation) would correspond to larger
inflows.
Lastly, the Recession variable is a binary dummy variable that controls for the
effects of the current recession. It is defined by the National Bureau of Economic
Research’s dates on US recessions, where the variable takes on the value of 1 during a
recessionary quarter and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on Recession, !7, is also ambiguous.
Investors are more likely to decrease their capital flows during bad economic times
(which is analogous to the reasoning of the positive sign on the ln(GDP) coefficient),
leading to a negative sign of !7. However, especially in the most recent recession, the
worldwide economy was not equally affected. The developed countries, where more of
the flows are originating from, were harder hit than the developing world. Therefore, the
current recession could have actually increased the flows to emerging markets, as
investors are looking for higher return on their investment than they are able to find in the
developed world. If this were the case, then !7 would be negatively signed. Note, that if
this were true, then the signs of the EMBI and IntRateSpread coefficients would also
have to be positive, indicating that investors indeed prefer return to risk.
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1. Capital Control Index Construction
An important difference between this paper and Clements and Kamil (2009) is the
measure of capital controls. Clements and Kamil focus on one particular capital control
for a very short period of time, and use a binary dummy variable to measure the effects
on capital flows into Colombia after the implementation of the policy. This paper,
however, focuses on a larger time span across more countries, so the binary dummy
variable is not a good measure. It does not capture the different types of capital controls,
nor does it differentiate between different levels of restrictiveness.
Here, a capital control index is created using data from the IMF’s Annual Reports
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Controls are separated in 13
categories9:
•

•

Controls on:
i. Capital Market Securities
ii. Money Market Instruments
iii. Collective Investment Securities
iv. Derivatives and other instruments
v. Commercial Credits
vi. Financial Credits
vii. Guarantees, Sureties, and Financial Backup Facilities
viii. Direct Investment
ix. Liquidation of Direct Investment
x. Real Estate Transactions
xi. Personal Capital Transactions
Provisions Specific to:
xii. Commercial Banks and other Credit Institutions
xiii. Institutional Investors

A value of 1 is given to each category where there is any control, and a value of 0 is
given to any category where there are no controls. Since quarterly data is being used and
AREAER only reports on a yearly basis, the detailed descriptions of each control in each
category given in the back of the report are used to put any change in the index in the
9

Detailed descriptions of these categories can be found in Appendix B.
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appropriate quarter of the year. If no explicit detail is given as to why or when the index
was changed, it is assumed that the change happened during the first quarter of the year.
One example of a change that occurred is in Brazil’s index from 2004Q4 to
2005Q1. As the AREAER report states, “The requirement to deposit long positions
exceeding the equivalent of US$6 million, including all currencies and all of each of the
bank's branches, with the CBB in dollars was abolished”. This causes the index to move
from 1 to 0 in the “Guarantees, Sureties, and Financial Backup Facilities” category. As
this change in law happened on March 14, 2005, the change is reflected in Quarter 1 of
2005.
Since capital controls might take longer to implement and be effective than the
quarter in which they are passed into law, the lag of this index is also used as a potential
measure of capital controls. This may pick up more effects from changes in the index
than the index would.
A potential shortcoming even with this detailed index is that it still does not
capture any changes within the categories as long as there is still some sort of control
before and after. Therefore, another variable is added to the regression: Change. This
variable is a binary dummy variable that is given a value of 1 when there is a change in
any category of capital controls that is not reflected in the index and a value of 0
otherwise. For example, if a tax rate is increased, the category in the index would be a
“1” for both before and after the increase, so the Change variable would also be a “1”.
However, if a tax was introduced, therefore changing the category in the index from “0”
to “1”, then the Change variable would be a “0”, as the change is reflected in the index.
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While this measure is an improvement over just the index, it does not differentiate
between the direction of the changes, therefore dampening its interpretation power. Two
alternative measures of changes not captured in the index are used to solve this problem.
First, Change2 differentiates the direction of the changes by giving more restrictive
changes10 a value of 1 (“increasing” the index) and more open changes11 a value of -1
(“decreasing” the index), with no changes continuing to be measured as 0. Second, using
PosChange and NegChange variables is an alternative way to measure the direction of
the changes not in the index, where both are binary dummy variables measuring more
restrictive and more open changes, respectively. While the expected sign of the Change
variable is unclear, the other two measures’ signs are clearer. For Change2, the expected
coefficient is negative, as a decrease in the measure (the index moving to -1) would be an
increase in the openness of the capital control policy, which should correspond to an
increase in flows. Likewise, an increase in the measure (the index moving to 1) would be
an increase in the restrictiveness of the controls, which would in turn correspond to a
decrease in flows. The rationale for PosChange is the same, where a value of 1 indicates
more restrictive controls and therefore less flows, causing the coefficient to be negatively
signed. For NegChange, however, the rationale is reversed, where a value of 1 indicates
more open controls and therefore more flows, causing the coefficient to be positively
signed.
2. Data
The data were collected from a variety of sources. The main sources are the
countries’ central bank statistical databases, along with multi-country databases such as
10

Example: a tax increases from 5% to 7%, or its coverage expands to include more asset types.
Example: a tax decreases from 5% to 3%, or its coverage decreases to include fewer asset
types.
11
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the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database and the Global Financial Data
database12. Summary statistics of the variables used are listed in Table 1.
One potential problem is the large range of values for multiple variables,
especially for the flows and FX volatility. This can create heteroskedasticity in the model.
Therefore, standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity (robust standard errors) are
reported throughout.
There are some missing data points for countries or specific quarters for specific
variables. Data are not available for either capital market depth measure for 2010 for any
country. Additionally, the EMBI spread is not available for South Africa until 2002Q2,
and the IntRateSpread is not available for South Africa until 2001Q2 and for Colombia
until 2002Q2.13
The inclusion of additional countries requires other adjustments to the variable
calculations. Because the EMBI spread is not calculated for South Korea or Thailand, the
EMBI for Developing Asia14 is used as a proxy, as done in Baba and Kokenyne (2011).
Additionally, this paper measures the volatility of the exchange rate with the variation, or
the (standard deviation)/(mean), of a three-month period. This standardizes the standard
deviations of exchange rates across countries, a problem that Clements and Kamil (2009)
did not have to deal with given they only study one country. The FXExApp is also
constructed differently. Due to lack of available forwards data, the observed FX rate three
12

See Appendix A for more details about data sources.
Other papers used higher frequency data, such as Clements and Kamil (2009) who use weekly
data. However, this paper will use quarterly data as higher frequency data are not available for all
countries or variables, notably for the long term flows, the capital market depth variables, the
EMBI spread, the recession variable, GDP, and for the short term flows for all countries except
Colombia.
14
Developing Asia includes People’s Republic of China; India; Indonesia; Republic of Korea;
Malaysia; Pakistan; Philippines; Taipei, China; and Thailand. For more details, please see
http://asianbondsonline.adb.org/documents/abm_sep_2011.pdf.
13
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months out is used as a proxy for the three-month forward rate. Furthermore, as
mentioned above, this paper uses a three quarter moving average of the flows, as well as
the given levels of the flows, in order to smooth the flows, which are rather volatile,
especially the short-term flows.
VI.

Results
1. Estimation
Using the above model, multiple regressions are estimated using the Generalized

Method of Moments technique. While other capital control models, like Clements and
Kamil (2009), used Ordinary Least Squares, the potential endogeneity of some of the
explanatory variables, especially the interest rates, is a concern. It is reasonable to believe
that interest rates are set in conjunction with capital control policies, and therefore that
they are not exogenous in this model. The GMM method allows for endogeneity in the
model without finding specific instruments for endogenous variables, alleviating the
problem of finding a suitable instrument. Additionally, the GMM method allows for
more efficient estimators than simply using the 2SLS approach, as the coefficients are
jointly determined (Wooldridge 2010).
Although multiple instruments were investigated, the regressions below all use
the fourth lag of ln(GDP) as the instrument. It is the least likely to be endogenous in the
short run, and provides a better fit than other instruments tried, such as the fourth lag of
the DebtMkt and EquityMkt variables and the first lag of ln(GDP). Additionally, all the
results include time and country fixed effects as further controls.
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2. Short Term Flow Results – Absolute Flows
The results in Table 2 show that capital controls do not have a consistently
significant effect on the volume of flows into emerging markets. Table 2 presents results
with the dependent variable as the given volume of short-term flows. There is some
significance of the capital control variables (either CapControl or LagCapControl), as
seen in specification (1), as well as borderline significance in specifications (2) and (3).
Additionally, there is significance seen in the Change variables, but not in the variations
with easy interpretations. Only Change has significance, the variable with an unclear
expected sign, instead of the other two measures (Change2 and PosChange have a
negative expected sign and NegChange has a positive expected sign). Other significant
variables across the multiple specifications are ln(GDP), EquityMkt, and FXExApp. In
multiple specifications, there are significant correctly signed coefficients of these
variables. This would suggest that business cycles, expected exchange rate appreciation,
and the depth of the equity markets are important for determining the flow of short term
capital. Not surprisingly, the great volatility in the short-term flows made the lag of the
dependent variable insignificant across all specifications where it is included.
When the EMBI and IntRateSpread variables are included, their negative signs
suggest that investors are responding more to the risk of the emerging markets than their
potential higher returns. This is also in line with the negatively signed Recession variable,
as investors are decreasing their risk tolerance during worse economic times and
decreasing their capital flows to emerging markets.
Comparing specifications (5) and (6) allows the measures of capital controls to be
directly compared. Both specifications use the CapControl measure, but the change
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measure varies. As there is little variation in some of the capital control index values
within a country, even across 11 years, the change variables might provide better insight
into the actual effects that a change in capital control policy will have on capital flows.
While the Change2 variable is used in specification (5) and the PosChange and
NegChange variables are used in specification (6), there is little difference in the results.
Even though all the change variables are correctly signed, none are significant. The
Change2 variable does increase the significance of the CapControl variable, but only
slightly and not enough to make it significant.
Specifications (4) and (6) similarly allow for a judge of the EMBI variable. While
the addition of the EMBI variable decreases the observations, the fit of the model does
not suffer. Instead, the addition of the correctly signed and borderline significant variable
increases the significance of the CapControl variable, as well as corrects the sign of the
FXVol and Recession variables.
3. Short Term Flow Results – Moving Averages and Differences
The short-term flow results are also calculated with the dependent variable of the
three quarter moving averages of the flows, as a way to control for some of the volatility
in the short-term flows, as well as with the change in the flows between periods as the
dependent variable. These results are shown in Table 3 and Table 4. Table 3 shows the
same specifications as Table 2, but with new dependent variables15. The few
specifications shown do not fit the data as well as with the absolute flows. This is
particularly true with specification (6), as all the variables combined do not have
significance at even the 35% level.
15

The exact same specifications are not always shown since the specifications did not converge
(the variance matrices were nonsymmetric or highly singular). Therefore, slightly different
specifications are shown instead.
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The moving average estimations also exhibit some signs of significant decreases
in capital flows coming from capital controls, but not consistently across all
specifications. In specification (2), the capital control index is negative and significant at
almost the 10% level. For the change in flows, there is not any significant negative
capital control effect, with only a borderline positive effect in specification (4).
There are also many specifications that are significant for the moving average
flows and the changes in flows that are not significant for the given flows. These are
shown in Table 4. Specifications (1) and (2) show that the addition of EMBI spread and
the absence of ln(GDP) made the capital control index go from insignificant to positive
and significant. While this is not the expected sign, the lack of variation in the capital
control index could be driving this result. When the lag flows are added in specification
(3), however, that positive and significant result disappears. Additionally, the lag flows,
even though they are insignificant, add to the overall explanatory power of this model, as
expressed by the Wald test statistic. While the Wald test statistic decreases with the
introduction of EMBI and the loss of ln(GDP), it increases again with the addition of the
lag flows.
In the fourth specification, the signs of the coefficients are mostly correct, but the
lack of significance of any of the explanatory variables, even with the overall significance
of the model, might have been the result of the dropping observations. This specification
saw a large drop in the observations compared to other specifications, which went under
300 for the first time down to 290. Additionally, specification (4) also shows no
significance of capital controls on capital inflows. These models also confirm the
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investors’ preferences for risk over reward in terms of the EMBI and IntRateSpread
variables, as once again these are both negatively signed.
The change in flows specifications do not differ much from the previous results,
but do confirm the findings with the given and moving average flows. Capital controls do
not significantly impact these flows either, with the exception of a borderline negative
significance in specification (6). The expected currency appreciation is again one of the
most important drivers of short-term flows, as seen in specifications (5) through (8).
FXExApp is significant in three out of the four specifications and negatively signed in all
four of the models. The preference of investors towards risk is also confirmed again with
the negative EMBI and IntRateSpread coefficients.
4. Long Term Flow Results
The results for long-term flows can be seen in Table 5. First, capital controls have
no significant effect on these flows. This is the expected result, as the recent controls
were made to target short-term, and not long-term, flows. Additionally, as seen in the
extremely low Wald statistics, this model is not a good fit for the long-term flows. This is
because, as described above, the flows have different determinants than short term flows,
as they are mostly comprised of FDI instead of FPI.
VII. Conclusions and Areas of Further Research
Capital controls have been widely debated for the past half century, and have only
recently been given by the IMF as a potential policy suggestion to attempt to either
change the composition of capital inflows or to reduce the amount of net capital inflows.
However, the results show that capital controls do not significantly reduce capital flows.
As a result, capital controls are not shown to be an effective policy for reducing the
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volume of capital flows. Therefore, emerging markets should consider other potential
policies to control the potential instability that may arise from their capital flows in the
coming years.
This paper is by no means exhaustive in its research, and therefore more research
can be done on the topic to provide a more conclusive result. This study only focuses on a
10-year snap shot that includes periods before and during a financial crisis. One area to
expand the research is to examine a longer period of time, with possibly more capital
control policy changes. A particularly useful time period would be one that included the
lead-up to a recession, the recession, and the post recessionary period, where countries
might be reacting to similar threats of sudden outflows. Additionally, the effect of capital
controls on long-term flows can be expanded further. This would mean developing a
better model for what effect capital controls have on long-term flows. Even though the
controls are targeted towards short-term flows, there could still be a detrimental effect on
the long-term flows. Furthermore, in any area of capital control research, further work
can be done on improving on and finding new measures of capital controls, especially
across countries. The index and binary dummy variables used in this paper are a good
proxy, but a more descriptive measure that can better pick up smaller changes in existing
policies would greatly enhance the research.
In summary, this paper finds that capital controls are not effective in decreasing
the volume of capital flows. This result holds across multiple measures of the flows and
even with the inclusion of a complex measure of capital controls, and confirmed the
findings of Baba and Kokenyne (2011) and Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2011). As a
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result, the lasting policy implication is that with the ease of worldwide capital mobility
today, inhibiting capital flows with capital controls no longer appears feasible.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
Variable

Unit of Measure

Observations

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

ST Flows
LT Flows
Cap Control
Change
Change2
PosChange
NegChange
FXVol
FXExApp
ln(GDP)
Recession
EquityMkt
DebtMkt
EMBI
IntRateSpread

Millions USD
Millions USD
Index
Binary
Index
Binary
Binary
---Percent
ln(Millions USD)
Binary
Index
Index
Index
Percent

352
352
352
352
352
352
352
352
352
352
352
320
320
343
338

2720.42
3940.12
9.51
0.34
-0.45
0.14
0.19
0.02
0.44
11.36
0.20
0.71
0.50
345.75
8.03

11417.99
11106.02
3.35
0.48
0.57
0.35
0.39
0.01
7.87
0.90
0.40
0.68
0.24
239.96
13.42

-77220
-79410
2
0
-1
0
0
0.00
-19.23
-5.41
0
0.12
0.20
74.25
-5.41

69900
81950
13
1
1
1
1
0.18
57.27
104.71
1
3.38
1.13
1984.5
104.71

Expected
Sign
------?
+
+
+
+
+ or + or -

36

Table 2. Short Term Flows: Quarterly Flows
(1)
Explanatory Variables:
-3708.97
CapControl

(2)

(0.07)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-3989.56

-8760.15

-1363.87

-1864.93

-1186.62

-2061.34

(0.18)

(0.37)

(0.81)

(0.73)

(0.58)

(0.38)

LagCapControl

-7140.06

Change

5322.74

8585.13

-16148.5

-6255.12

(0.63)

(0.09)

(0.22)

(0.59)

(0.18)

29281.18

Change2

-6051.87

(0.29)

(0.56)

PosChange

13475.33

-11130.75

(0.05)

(0.71)

NegChange

18878

3498.78

(0.19)

FXVol

(0.84)

50575.77

-267452.4

275294.5

115962.1

444087.7

471664.3

(0.63)

(0.24)

(0.76)

(0.57)

(0.44)

(0.56)

-1187.01

-469.64

-438.06

9.83

(0.16)

(0.17)

(0.08)

(0.98)

FXExApp
ln(GDP)

-82782.56

196722.4

-92815.58

136612.1

(0.34)

(0.18)

(0.24)

(0.06)

(0.08)

-1956.59

-4529.23

Recession
EquityMkt
DebtMkt

LagFlows

-1473.98

622.33

(0.76)

(0.91)

(0.93)

(0.69)

(0.69)

83533.09

8557.10

19760.07

38163.47

(0.25)

(0.07)

(0.04)

(0.05)

458413.4

-419015.8

(0.04)

(0.27)

-50.26

EMBI
IntRateSpread

-6181.06

164176.6

(0.19)

-966.79
(0.29)

-0.47

-1.96

-0.26

-0.15

(0.45)

(0.49)

(0.81)

(0.89)

Wald test statistic
104.06
101.82
44.41
61.27
20.40
352.04
13.05
15.61
Prob>chi2
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0048
0.0000
0.0423
0.0289
Observations
306
312
312
336
344
344
320
320
Instruments
37
37
37
41
41
41
37
37
Source: Author’s Estimates
Notes: 1) P-values are listed under the coefficient estimates, and are calculated using heteroskedasticity corrected standard
errors. 2) All models are estimated using GMM with the 4th lag of ln(GDP) as the instrument. 3) Year and country fixed
effects are included in all specifications.
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Table 3. Short Term Flows: Moving Averages and Changes
(Quarterly Flow Specifications)
(1)
Dependent
Moving
Variable
Avg
Explanatory Variables:
CapControl

(2)
Moving
Avg

(3)
Moving
Avg

(4)

(5)

(6)

Change

Change

Change

-4735.88
(0.11)

1331.81

693223.7

86150.36

-221193.4

(0.64)

(0.13)

(0.34)

(0.28)

LagCapControl

-6000.89

Change

1699.47

-7167.36

-5819.82

1126.85

71995.91

(0.90)

(0.03)

(0.07)

(0.85)

(0.14)

-624403.1

(0.28)

13743.01

Change2
FXVol

(0.46)

395978

188732

147632.7

-2147378

231492.9

(0.25)

(0.22)

(0.21)

(0.11)

(0.57)

(0.04)

-315.01

-1029.35

582.94

-750.73

(0.76)

(0.18)

FXExApp
ln(GDP)

40189.56

-22923.53

60729.44

(0.68)

(0.54)

(0.25)

(0.54)

(0.17)

-146266.5

-63566.99

(0.08)

39475.2

Recession

(0.41)

13775.1

(0.12)

(0.24)

EquityMkt

67427.09

41558.27

25094.21

-499993.2

52785.84

7362.14

(0.13)

(0.01)

(0.58)

(0.13)

(0.08)

(0.94)

DebtMkt

-535225.1

LagFlows

(0.36)

-1.72
(0.21)

Wald test statistic
13.19
10.55
48.00
27.16
34.95
7.78
Prob>chi2
0.0402
0.0611
0.0000
0.0003
0.0000
0.3521
Observations
312
312
312
304
312
312
Instruments
37
37
37
37
37
37
Source: Author’s Estimates
Notes: 1) Specifications (2) and (3) are not identical to those of the absolute flows due to highly
singular or nonsymmetric variance matrices. These specifications omit the Recession variable. 2)
P-values are listed under the coefficient estimates, and are calculated using heteroskedasticity
corrected standard errors. 3) All models are estimated using GMM with the 4th lag of ln(GDP) as
the instrument. 4) Year and country fixed effects are included in all specifications.
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Table 4. Short Term Flows: Moving Averages and Changes
(New Specifications)
(1)
Dependent
Moving
Variable
Avg
Explanatory Variables:

(2)
Moving
Avg

(3)
Moving
Avg

(4)
Moving
Avg

(5)
Change

(6)
Change

-11091.88

CapControl

(0.53)

LagCapControl

30944.17

-7358.781

25825.01

-4193.32

(0.17)

(0.05)

(0.59)

(0.23)

(0.12)

Change

-6980.40

-3124.08

-23329.67

(0.25)

(0.37)

(0.35)

-9500.42
(0.24)

6039.48

4829.91

7795.96

(0.49)

(0.53)

(0.76)

102188

Change2

(0.27)

PosChange

68565.51

NegChange

-31395.74

(0.25)
(0.26)

FXVol

8344.13

47189.77

87319.5

(0.95)

(0.63)

(0.51)

FXExApp

-687.11

-338.97

-201.98

(0.05)

(0.12)

(0.65)

ln(GDP)

121750.3

Recession

-5263.80

-3975.59

-3825.17

(0.31)

(0.22)

(0.40)

(0.10)

425801.1
(0.06)

-1843.62

-831.25

-521.51

-911.05
(0.03)

(0.09)

(0.14)

(0.18)

-624927.4

6442.57

-68673.21

-90920.48

(0.26)

(0.98)

(0.17)

(0.48)

5772.36
(0.33)

6225477

DebtMkt

(0.28)

-4.44

-68.77

-273.70

-6.24

(0.64)

(0.32)

(0.29)

(0.88)

-8505.83

IntRateSpread
LagFlows

(8)
Change

-22365.26

(0.41)

3914.18

EMBI

(7)
Change

-38.08
(0.33)

-84.22

(0.27)

(0.97)

-1.46

-6.61

-2.78

0.16

0.03

(0.59)

(0.39)

(0.25)

(0.82)

(0.97)

Wald test statistic
97.80
16.25
88.58
63.25
27.33
72.84
14.86
15.37
Prob>chi2
0.0000
0.0125
0.0000
0.0000
0.0003
0.0000
0.0110
0.0176
Observations
336
328
321
290
329
326
336
336
Instruments
40
40
40
37
41
41
41
41
Source: Author’s Estimates
Notes: 1) P-values are listed under the coefficient estimates, and are calculated using heteroskedasticity corrected standard
errors. 2) All models are estimated using GMM with the 4th lag of ln(GDP) as the instrument. 3) Year and country fixed
effects are included in all specifications.
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Table 5. Long Term Flows
(1)
Explanatory Variables:
-12499.69
CapControl
(0.38)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

827.75

-3093.69

-3124.83

-272058.9

(0.46)

(0.41)

(0.39)

(0.40)

LagCapControl
-18777.91

Change

(0.23)

3462.65

Change2

6586.80

(0.50)

(0.42)

PosChange

68425.32
(0.37)

(0.67)

NegChange

-20397.5

-8345.20

(0.47)

FXVol
FXExApp
ln(GDP)

5288.63
(0.66)

-40385.16

81300.06

48782.85

(0.87)

(0.76)

(0.69)

(0.17)

-188.28

-199.53

-175.83

319.57

(0.53)

(0.61)

(0.59)

-418528.8

-1635065
(0.66)

-883272.5

(0.42)

(0.18)

Recession

-11233.56

EquityMkt

-117638.1

DebtMkt

(0.51)
(0.54)

697449.6
(0.43)

-11.63

EMBI
IntRateSpread

(0.47)

-2541.48
(0.45)

LagFlows
Wald test statistic
Prob>chi2
Observations
Instruments

0.96
0.9656
306
37

-0.10

-0.85

-0.73

(0.87)

(0.63)

(0.47)

11.74
0.0680
336
41

0.76
0.9931
344
41

0.83
0.9749
344
41

4.20
0.7566
320
37

Source: Author’s Estimates
Notes: 1) Specifications (2), (3), and (4) are not identical to those of the absolute
flows due to highly singular or nonsymmetric variance matrices. These specifications
omit the Recession variable. 2) P-values are listed under the coefficient estimates, and
are calculated using heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors. 3) All models are
estimated using GMM with the 4th lag of ln(GDP) as the instrument. 4) Year and
country fixed effects are included in all specifications.
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Appendix A: Data Source Summary
Table A1. Data Source Summary
Variable/Country
ST Flows

LT Flows
Cap Control
Change
Change2
PosChange
NegChange
FXVol

FXExApp
ln(GDP)
Recession
EquityMkt
DebtMkt
EMBI
IntRateSpread2

Brazil

Colombia
Indonesia
South Korea
Peru
South Africa
Thailand
Turkey
Banco de la
Central
Banco Central
Bank
South African
Bank of
Central Bank of the
Republica
Bank of Korea
Reserve Bank
do Brasil
Indonesia
Reserve Bank
Thailand
Republic of Turkey
Colombia
of Peru
Banco de la
Central
Banco Central
Bank
South African
Bank of
Central Bank of the
Republica
Bank of Korea
Reserve Bank
do Brasil
Indonesia
Reserve Bank
Thailand
Republic of Turkey
Colombia
of Peru
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. IMF. 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. IMF. 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. IMF. 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. IMF. 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. IMF. 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011
Board of
Board of
Banco de la
Central
Banco Central
Bank
Governor of the
South African Governor of the Central Bank of the
Republica
Reserve Bank
do Brasil
Indonesia
Federal Reserve
Reserve Bank Federal Reserve Republic of Turkey
Colombia
of Peru
System
System
Board of
Board of
Banco de la
Central
Banco Central
Bank
Governor of the
South African Governor of the Central Bank of the
Republica
Reserve Bank
do Brasil
Indonesia
Federal Reserve
Reserve Bank Federal Reserve Republic of Turkey
Colombia
of Peru
System
System
--------------------------------------------------------------------IMF IFS Database-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------NBER: the National Bureau of Economic Research-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------World Bank Financial Structure Database-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------World Bank Financial Structure Database-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Global Financial Data----------------------------------------------------------------Banco de la
Central
Banco Central
Bank
South African
Bank of
Central Bank of the
Republica
Bank of Korea
Reserve Bank
do Brasil
Indonesia
Reserve Bank
Thailand
Republic of Turkey
Colombia
of Peru

Notes: 1) The IMF IFS database is the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics Database. 2) The US Money Market rate is also used to calculate
IntRateSpread, and that data is found through the Board of Governor of the Federal Reserve System. 3) FPI data for Ecuador and the Philippines related to Figure 3 is from the
IMF Balance of Payments Statistics database.
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Appendix B: IMF AREAER Capital Control Categories
The IMF AREAER categories are detailed in the front of each report, along with
further breakdowns. The following descriptions follow very closely those given in the
reports.
i.

Controls on Market Securities: Refers to shares and other securities of a participating
nature, and bonds and other securities with an original maturity of more than one year.

ii.

Controls on Money Market Instruments: Refers to securities with an original maturity of
one year or less and includes short-term instruments, such as certificates of deposit and
bills of exchange. The category also includes treasury bills and other short-term
government paper, bankers’ acceptances, commercial paper, interbank deposits, and
repurchase agreements.

iii.

Controls on Collective Investment Securities: Includes share certificates and registry
entries or other evidence of investor interest in an institution for collective investment,
such as mutual funds, and unit and investment trusts.

iv.

Controls on Derivatives and Other Instruments: Refers to operations in other negotiable
instruments and nonsecured claims not covered under the above subsections. These may
include operations in rights; warrants; financial options and futures; secondary market
operations in other financial claims (including sovereign loans, mortgage loans,
commercial credits, negotiable instruments originating as loans, receivables, and
discounted bills of trade); forward operations (including those in foreign exchange);
swaps of bonds and other debt securities; credits and loans; and other swaps (e.g., interest
rate, debt/equity, equity/ debt, foreign currency, and swaps of any of the instruments
listed above). Controls on operations in foreign exchange without any other underlying
transaction (spot or forward trading on the foreign exchange markets, forward cover
operations, etc.) are also included.

v.

Controls on Commercial Credits: Covers operations directly linked with international
trade transactions or with the rendering of international services.

vi.

Controls on Financial Credits: Includes credits other than commercial credits granted by
all residents, including banks, to nonresidents, or vice versa.

vii.

Controls on Guarantees, Sureties, and Financial Backup Facilities: Includes guarantees,
sureties, and financial backup facilities provided by residents to nonresidents and vice
versa. It also includes securities pledged for payment or performance of a contract—such
as warrants, performance bonds, and standby letters of credit—and financial backup
facilities that are credit facilities used as a guarantee for independent financial operations.

viii.

Controls on Direct Investment: Refers to investments for the purpose of establishing
lasting economic relations both abroad by residents and domestically by nonresidents.
These investments are essentially for the purpose of producing goods and services, and,
in particular, in order to allow investor participation in the management of an enterprise.
The category includes the creation or extension of a wholly owned enterprise, subsidiary,
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or branch and the acquisition of full or partial ownership of a new or existing enterprise
that results in effective influence over the operations of the enterprise.
ix.

Controls on Liquidation of Direct Investment: Refers to the transfer of principal,
including the initial capital and capital gains, of a foreign direct investment in the
Controls on Direct Investment definition.

x.

Controls on Real Estate Transactions: Refers to the acquisition of real estate not
associated with direct investment, including, for example, investments of a purely
financial nature in real estate or the acquisition of real estate for personal use.

xi.

Controls on Personal Capital Transactions: Covers transfers initiated on behalf of
private persons and intended to benefit other private persons. It includes transactions
involving property to which the promise of a return to the owner with payments of
interest is attached (e.g., loans or settlements of debt in their country of origin by
immigrants) and transfers effected free of charge to the beneficiary (e.g., gifts and
endowments, loans, inheritances and legacies, and emigrants’ assets).

xii.

Provisions Specific to Commercial Banks and other Credit Institutions: Describes
regulations that are specific to these institutions, such as monetary, prudential, and
foreign exchange controls. Inclusion of an entry in this category does not necessarily
signify that the aim of the measure is to control the flow of capital. Some of these items
(e.g., borrowing abroad, lending to nonresidents, purchase of locally issued securities
denominated in foreign exchange, investment regulations) may be repetitions of entries
under respective categories of controls on capital and money market instruments, on
credit operations, or on direct investments, when the same regulations apply to
commercial banks as well as to other residents.

xiii.

Provisions Specific to Institutional Investors: Describes controls specific to institutions,
such as insurance companies, pension funds, investment firms (including brokers,
dealers, or advisory firms), and other securities firms (including collective investment
funds). Incorporates measures that impose limitations on the composition of the
institutional investors’ foreign or foreign currency assets (reserves, accounts) and
liabilities (e.g., investments in equity capital of institutional investors or borrowing from
nonresidents) and/or that differentiate between residents and nonresidents. Examples of
such controls are restrictions on investments because of rules regarding the technical,
mathematical, security, or mandatory reserves; solvency margins; premium reserve
stocks; or guarantee funds of nonbank financial institutions. Inclusion of an entry in this
category does not necessarily signify that the aim of the measure is to control the flow of
capital.
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